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ABATEMENT.

Death of Defendant after Appeal.-Where in an action for malicious
prosecution, the plaintiff appeals from a judgment in favor of the
defendant, and after the appeal taken the defendant dies, the suit will
abate: Clark v. Carroll,59 Md.
ACCOUNT.

.Profits of Illegal Investment qf Trust Moneys.-If two executors
have united in misusing funds in their hands, in the purchase of laud
for their own benefit, and profits have arisen from such purchase, which
are held by one of them, or the title to the land stands in the name of
one ofthem, and it does not appear that the persons interested in the
estate are debarred by acquiescence or otherwise from their right to
avail themselves of the advantage of the purchase, the other executor
cannot maintain a bill in equity for an account and for the payment to
him of a proportionate share of the profits: Jowen v. Richardson, 133
Mass.
AGENT.
Sale to Agent-Susequent Action against Principal.-If a vendor,
with full knowledge that the sale was made to a husband as agent for
his wife and for her benefit, elected to give exclusive credit to the
husband as agent, he could not afterwards recover from the wife as
principal; but if the vendor was ignorant of the fact that he was dealing with the agent of another, and that the latter received the goods
and. used them, and they were really bought for the principal, though
unknown to the seller when sold, such vendor may recov6r from the
principal when this fact comes to his knowledge, though credit was
given to the agent: Miller v. Watt, 65 or 66 Ga.
I Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions
filed during Oct. Term 1882. The cases will probably appear in 107 Otto.
2 From J. R. Lumpkin, Esq., Reporter. The cases will probably appear in
65 or 66 Georgia Reports.
3 From E. L. Do Witt, Esq., Reporter. The cases will probably appear in 38
or 39 Ohio St. Reports.
4 From J. Shaaf Stockett, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 59 Md. Reports.
6 From John Lathrop, Esq., Reporter ; to appear in 133 Mass. Reports.
6 From T. K. Skinker, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 76 Mo. Reports.
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ATTACHMENT.

Claim of Property seized under Attachment-Rifght of Claimant to
Damages under the Issue of Property vel non-Appraisement-Effect of
Bond being in a. less Amount than required by the Law.-The Act of
1876, ch. 285, prescribed a mode in which the claimant of personal
property, goods or chattels taken under attachment or execution, might.
by filing a petition and giving bond, procure a discharge of the property.
Held, 1st. That upon the trial of the issue joined upon such claim of
property, the question of damages, as well as the right of property, is
to be settled. 2d. That to entitle the claimant to recover damages it is
not necessary that his petition should in terms claim them. 3d. That
the requirement by said Act, of a bond to be given by the claimant, in
"double the appraised value of the property attached or seized,"
necessitates an appraisement, whenever a claim of property shall be set
up. 4th. That taking the bond in less than the amount prescribed,
neither works a total defeat of the claimant's right to recover, nor
prevents an inquiry of damages: Turner v. Lytle, 59 Md.
Whether the claimant is compelled, if he knows of the levy and
seizure, to resort to this method of asserting his rights, in order to
secure the property, and recover damages, u~ereP Id.
BILLS AND iNOTES.

.Negotiablelnstrument.-A promissory note, payable "on demand or
in three years from this date," with interest at a certain rate "during
said term or for such further time as said principal sum or any part
thereof shall remain unpaid," is not negotiable: Mahoney v. Fitzpatrick, 133 Mass.
CHARITY.
When Gift for will be upheld.-William Russell, "for the purpose of
founding an institution for the education of youth in St. Louis county,
Missouri," granted lands and personal .property to Horner and his successors in trust "for the use and benefit of the Russell Institute of St.
Louis, Missouri," with directions to sell, and to account for and pay
over the proceeds "to Thomas Allen, President of the Board of Trustees of the said Russell Institute at St. Louis, Missouri," whose receipt
should be a full discharge to the grantee. -Held,that this was a charitable gift, valid against the donor's heirs and next of kin, although the
institution was neither established nor incorporated in the lifetime of
the donor or of Allen: Russell v. Allen, S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1882.
See also, Jones v. Habersham, same court and term.
CONFLICT OF LAWS.

See Corporation.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

See Will.

Eminent Domain-Lahes of Landowner-Injunction.-While the
Constitution of 1877 provides that private property shall not be taken
or damaged for public use unless just and adequate compensation be
first paid, yet where a landowner permitted a railroad company to lay
out and coirstruct its road through. his land and appropriate timber

thereon, without any objection until the entire road had been completed
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and equipped at large expense, his property forming but a small fraction
thereof, he could not then enjoin the use of the entire road until his
damages should be assessed and settled. One cannot stand by and suffer
another to expend large amounts of money on his land as a part of a
great system of improvement, and then stop by injunction the entire
system until he is paid: Griffin v. Augusta and Knoxville Railroad Co.,
65 or 66 Geo.
Taz on Insurance Companies.-The statute of 1880, c..227, imposing upon every corporation and association engaged within the Commonwealth in the business of life insurance an annual excise tax, "to be
determined by ass essment of the same upon a valuation equal to the
aggregate net value of all policies in force on the 31st day of December
then next preceding, issued or assumed by such corporation or association, and held by residents of the Commonwealth, at the rate of onehalf of one per cent. per annum," is constitutional: Conn. M11utual
Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 133 Mass.
.Ex post facto Law, what is-Point of Time to be considered.-The
plaintiff in error stood convicted of murder in the first degree by the
judgment of the Supreme Court of the state of Missouri. He had been
previously sentenced to twenty-five years' imprisonment on his plea of
guilty of murder in the second degree, which sentence was, on his
appeal, reversed and set aside. By the law of Missouri in force when
the homicide was committed, this conviction was an acquittal of the
higher crime of murder in the first degree, but that law was changed
before the plea of guilty, so that a judgment on that plea, set aside
lawfully, should not be held to be an acquittal of the higher crime:
Hfeld, that as to this case the new law was an ex post facto law, within
the meaning of sect. 10, art. 1, of the Constitution of the United States,
and that plaintiff in error could not be again tried for murder in the
first degree: King v. The State of Missouri, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term
a882.

,

* The distinction between retrospective laws, which affect the remedy
or the mode of procedure, and those which operate directly on the offence,
held to be unsound where, in the latter case, they affect to his serious
disadvantage any substantial right which the party charged with crime
had under the law as it stood when the offence was committed : Id.
Any law is an ex post facto law, within the meaning of the Constitu, tion, which is passed after the commission of a crime charged against a
defendant, and which, in relation to that offence or its consequences, alters
the situation of the party to his disadvantage; and no one can be criminally
punished in this country, except according to a law prescribed for his
.government by the sovereign authority before the imputed offence was
committed, and which existed as a law at the time: Id.
CONTRACT.

See Interest.

CORPORATION.

Sale of Shares of Stock as full paid Shares-Bona Fide Purchasers
,-Propertyin Payment of Capital .tock-Rights of Creditors.-Where
shares of the capital stock are issued by a corporation to the original
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subscribers as fall paid shares, and are sold by them as such, a purchaser
thereof in good faith cannot be held liable to a creditor of the corporation in the value of his stock as for unpaid instalments: Brant v.
Elden, 59 Md.
The unpaid subscriptions of an insolvent corporation, in the hands
of a bonafide purchaser without notice, do not constitute a trust fund
which may be pursued by the creditors of the corporation, and subjected
to the payment of their claims : Id.
A corporation may receive in payment of shares of its capital stock
any property which it may lawfully purchase, and so long as the transaction stands unimpeached for fraud, courts will treat as a payment that
which the parties themselves have so regarded, and this, too, in cases
where the rights of creditors are involved: Id.
Liability for Debts of Corporationof one holding Stockc as Collateral
Security- Conflict of Law between lUiited States Courts and those of
the State.-By a statute of Missouri, stockholders of a corporation at
its dissolution are liable for its debts; but it is provided that no person
holding stock as collateral security shall be so liable, but the persons
pledging such stock shall be considered as holding the same and liable:
Held, 1. That persons to whom stock of a corporation is pledged as collateral security by the corporation itself are within the exemption of the
statute; 2. That certificates of the stock absolute on their face, issued
to a creditor as collateral security, or in trust, may be shown to be so
held by evidence in pais; 3. That the holder of such stock as collateral
security, or in trust, though he vote on such stock, is not thereby estopped from showing that the stock belongs to the company and not to
him, and that he only holds it as collateral security: Burgess v. Seligman, S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1882.
The Supreme Court of Missouri, after the transaction arose, and after
the circuit court had decided this case, made a contrary decision against
the same stockholders, at the suit of another plaintiff, holding that the
clause of exemption in the statute does not extend to persons receiving
stock as collateral security from the corporation itself; and this decision
being urged as conclusive upon the federal courts: Held, that this court
is not bound to follow the decision of the state court in such a case : Id.
The federal courts have an independent jurisdiction in the administration of state laws in cases between citizens of different states, co-ordinate with, and not subordinate to, that of the state courts, and are bound
to exercise their own judgment as to the meaning and effect of those
laws : Id.
The federal courts will follow the rules of property and action which
have been established by the course of the decisions of the courts of
the state, especially with regard to the law of real estate and the construction of state constitutions and statutes : but where the law has not been
thus settled, it is the right and duty of the federal courts to exercise
their own judgment, though for the sake of harmony they will lean
toward an agreement of views with the state courts if the question
seems to them balanced with doubt: Id.
Contract between Members as to ote-Public Policy.-A contract
between two stockholders in a corporation, by the terms of which one,
in consideration of a sum of money paid to him by the other, agrees to
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vote for a certain person as manager of the corporation, and also to vote
to increase the salaries of the officers of the corporation, including that
of the manager, is void as against public policy, unless it is assented to
by all the stockholders of the corporation ; and whether it is valid if so
assented to, quere ? Woodruff v. Wentwort7, 133 Mass.
CRIMINAL LAW.

See ConstitutionalLaw; Jury.

Pleading.-Where a criminal statute uses disjunctive language in
defining an offence, an indictment under it may be drawn in the conjunctive. Thus, a statute made it an offence to "sell or give away"
An indictment
intoxicating liquors under certain circumstances.
charged that defendant did "sell and give away" such liquors: .ield,
that it was not bad for duplicity: The State v. Pittman, 76 Mo.
Defendant as a Witness.-If the defendant in a criminal case testifies
in his own behalf, his relation to the case may be considered by the jury
as affecting his credibility: The State v. Sanders, 76 Mo.
Practice- Conviction on one Count only/.-While the court may, 1 is
not bound to, receive a verdict which finds the defendant guilty on one
count, without any finding as to the other counts; and, as a general
rule, where such verdict is tendered, the court should require the jury
to deliberate further, so as to be able to respond to each count : Jackson
v. The State, 38 or 39 Ohio St.
Recognisance-Informality in.-The principal and sureties bound in
a recognisance for the appearance of the principal before a court, are
presumed to know when and where the term will commence, and if the
obligation, in view of such presumed knowledge, appears with reasonable
certainty,.the recognisance will not be deemed invalid upon the ground
that the language of the statute providing therefor has not been strictly
followed: Jedlicka v. The State, 38 or 39 Ohio St.
Where a statute, in prescribing the terms and conditions of a recognisance, requires that the accused shall be bound to appear at the next
term, a recognisance omitting the word next, but strictly pursuing the
statute in all other respects, will not be deemed invalid for such
omission : Id.
Sef-Defence.--In all cases of self-defence, whether it be of life or
limb, or of-any threatened felony on the person of the accused, the law
of justifiable homicide is, that it must be made to appear that it wasabsolutely necessary to kill the deceased in the opinion of the slayer,
founded on good reason, in order to save his life or prevent a felony on
his person; and also, either that the deceased was the assailant or that
the slayer had really and in good faith endeavored to decline any further struggle before the mortal blow was stricken: Heard v. State, 65
or 66 Geo.
DAM'AGES.

Breach of Contract to deliver Good.s-Pleading.-In actions by
vendee against vendor for breach of contract to deliver goods, the
general rule is, that the measure of damages is the difference between
the contract price and the market price at the time and place of delivery;
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but where an article is purchased, not for the domestic market, but to
be shipped abroad, and the fact was shown on the face of the written
contract and was known to the vendor, and it was impossible for the
vendee to discover the inferiority of the article (which had been fraudulently substituted by the employees of the vendor) until it had reached
its ultimate destination, the true measure of damages is the difference
between the market price of the article contracted for, at the date of
its arrival, and the price afterwards realized upon a sale thereof, together
with the necessary and proper costs and expenses incurred in making
'the sale: Camden Consolidated Oil Co. v. Schlens, 59 Md.
Where in an action by vendee against vendor for breach of contract
to deliver goods, the damages claimed by the plaintiff are not in their
nature special, but such as are the natural and proximate result of the
breach, it is not necessary that they should be particularly stated in the
declaration : Id.
In an action by vendee against vendor for breach of contract to deliver
goods-the breach being a failure to deliver the kind and quality of
article contracted for-it is immaterial as to the legal right of the plaintiff to recover, whether the breach was caused by accident or design.
It is not the less a breach, because the failure to deliver the article purchased, proceeded from the fraudulent acts of the defendant's agents:
Id.
DEBTOR

AN)

OPREDITOR.

See Trust.

Gift by Uusband to TWfe.-A gift by husband to wife will not be
held void because it embraces all the property of the grantor; at least,
not unless it is shown to be more than a reasonable provision for her:
Wood v. Broadley, 76 Mo.
Creditors under the Statute of 13th Elizabeth, ch. 5-Judgment"
Creditorin an, Action of trespass.-The Statute of 13th Elizabeth, ch.
5, is sufficiently comprehensive in its terms to embrace, and does
embrace, not only creditors technically so, but "all others who have
cause of actiun, or suit, or any penalty or forfeiture ; and embraces
actions of slander, trespass and other torts:" Welde v. Scotten,
59 Md.
The judgment creditor in an action ot trespass, has a judgment for
such a cause of action as justifies his attacking any conveyance of the
defendant made pending the suit, as fraudulently made and executed
against him, if he has cause so to suppose i and should not be
prevented by injunction from putting himself into such position
that he may have the question of the bona fides of the grantee's purchase
tested in a court of law and before a jury, through an action of ejectmeat: ITd.
.Assignment for Creditors-Powersgiven to Assignee by' the DeedWhen void.-An Arkansas statute required the assignee to sell all
the property assigned to him at public auction within one hundred
and twenty days. An assignment conferred on the trustees power
"to sell and dispose of all of said property for cash as he should deem
advisable and right, and to this end use his own discretion, subject to
the supervision of the creditors * -': * and to conduct and transact all
of the business as he may deem proper in the exercise of a sound dis-
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cretion," &c. 'Held, that the deed in effect authorized the assignee to
sell at private sale, and at such time and in such manner as he should
deem advisable 'and right, contrary to the mandates of the statute, and
was void, and that the goods assigned could be seized and sold under
execution writs against the assignors: Jaffrazy v. _McGehee, S. C. U. S.,

Oct., Term 1882.

-

Insolvency-Preference by Guardianto Ward.-A guardian, who had
misappropriated money belonging to his ward, being insolvent, within
six months before the filing of a petition in insolvency against him, and
with a. view to give a preference to his ward, deposited his own money
in a savings bank in his name as guardian of the ward. Held, that his
assignee in insolvency could maintain a bill in equity to recover the
amount so deposited, although the ward was ignorant of the misappropriation and of the fact of the guardian's insolvency: Bush v. iloore,
133 Mass.
DEED.
Conveyance of Coat in Land.-The granting clause in a deed was as
follows: "The first party has agreed to sell and does hereby give,
grant, bargain, sell and convey" unto the second party, their heirs and
assigns, "all the stone coal lying and being in, under and upon certain
premises," in consideration of thirty cents per ton on all coal when
mined, and'the second party bound themselves to mine at least three
thousand tons annually. It was.also stipulated that the second party
"shall have theright to abandon the contract at any time when they
shall determine, in their judgment, that said coal, in quantity, quality
and condition, is no longer, minable with economy and profit." Held,
1st. -All minable coal in place passed absolutely to the grantees. 2d.
After such conveyance no interest in the minable coal remained in the
grantor subject ,to, be mortgaged as land. 3d. A mortgage upon the
remaining interest of the grantor in the land,, did not cover the purchase-money due or to become due from the purchasers of the coal:
Edwards v. McC'lurg, 38 or 39 Ohio St.
..
.

DoNAIO iMORTIS OAUSA.

What does not Constitte-Chosein Actlon.-H. M..Chaney, during
his last sickness, and in apprehension of death,- endorsed a certificate
of deposit whic h was payable to his order, as follows: "Pay to Martin
Basket,' of 'Henderson, Kentucky; no one else; then not til my death.
My life seems to be uncertain. I may live through this spell. Then I
will attend to it myself. I. M. CIIA'NEY." Chaney then delivered the
certificate to Basket, and died. 'Held, not to constitute a valid donatio,
mortis causa: Basket v. Hassell, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1882.
A delivery of a chose in action, in terms, which confers upon the
donee power to control the fund only after the death of the donor,
when by the instrument itself it is presently payable, is testamentary.
in'character, and not good as'a gift: Id.
EQUITY.

See Account.

What insuffcient to give Jurisdictionin.-An assignee of a chose in
action, or any other cestui quetrust, cannot, merely-'because his interest
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is an equitable one, proceed in a court of equity for the recovery of his
demand: Guaranty and Indemnity Co. v. Water Co., S. 0. U. S.', Oct.
Term 1882.
Certain bondholders, whose bonds with others were secured by a
common mortgage given by a corporation, filed a bill to recover certain
moneys alleged to be due on a contract made by the city of 'Memphis
with the mortgagor, which contract was assigned in the mortgage as
part of the security for the bonds. Hfeld, that as the demand against.
the city was cognizable at law in the name of the mortgagor, and no
special circumstances being shown for a resort to equity, the bill should
be dismissed: Id.
When Defendant in a Judgment at Law may not enjoin Proceedings
,under it.-The refusal of the trial court to grant a new trial cannot
be reviewed by a bill in equity to enjoin proceedings on the judgment;
nor will such matter as should have been urged in favor of the new
trial form good ground for such a bill: Embry v. Palmer, S. 0. U. S.,
Oct. Term 1882.

Eaos AND APPEALS.
Pleading of Facts occurringafter Appeal and Operating as a Bar to
the Suit.-The payee of two promissory notes, given in part execution
of a single contract, brought separate actions thereon against the maker,
who in each action interposed the same counterclaim for damages caused
by the payee's alleged fraud in making the contract. In one of these
actions, a demurrer to this counterclaim was sustained, and after final
judgment on the note, and after error was pending in the appellate court
to reverse the judgment on the ground that the court erred in disallowing the counterclaim, the defendant prosecuted his suit for damages
thereon in the other action, and accepted an agreed amount as his damages arising on such counterclaim, which was credited on the note sued
on in that action, and judgment was rendered for the plaintiff for the
balance due on that note. These facts were by leave of the appellate
court, brought into the record by answer, to which the plaintiff in error
demurred. field, 1st. That facts of this nature occurring since the final
judgment sought to be reversed, which in law, operate as a release, waiver
or bar of the errors assigned, may be pleaded in the appellate court, as
a defence to a proceeding in error. 2d. That the foregoing facts are
in legal effect, a withdrawal of the counterclaim, and the plaintiff in
error having received in the other action the damages arising on the
same, waives his right to reverse the judgment for error in disallowing the same claim for damages in the action pending in the appellate
court: .atthews v. Davis, 38 or 39 Ohio St.
ESTOPPEL. See Corporation.
Recitals in Deed.-A grantee is not estopped by a recital in his deed
from showing the real consideration upon which it was executed. Wood
v. Broadley, 76 Mo.
EXECUTION.
EXECUTORS.
VOL. XXX.-44

See Attachment
See Account; Surety.
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EVIDENCE.
FRAUD.

See Criminal Law.

See Debtor and Creditor.

FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
-Promiseto pay Note in Considerationof Purchase at Sale of Security.
-Defendant promised plaintiff that if he would attend a sale about to
be made under a deed of trust given to secure the note of a third person, held by plaintiff, and would buy in the property for defendant, he
would pay plaintiff the amount of the note. Held, that the promise
was not within the Statute of Frauds, and did not need to be in writing:
i ale v. Stuart, 76 Mo.
Novation.-Where a debtor, his creditor and a third person, who
owed the debtor, came together, and it ,was agreed that the third person
should pay the creditor, who thereupon looked to him for payment, and
the debtor was released, the third person became the debtor by substitution, and the contract was not within the Statute of Frauds : H~owell v.
Field, 65 or 66 Geo.
GUARDIAN AND WARD.

See Debtor and Creditor.

HIGHWAY.
Abandonment.-The abandonment of a public highway by mere non
user does not work a forfeiture of the right to its use. An existing
public road cannot be discontinued without the order of the ordinary or
county commissioners, where there are such commissioners, based upon
application and notice and duly registered in the proper office; Jones v.

Williams, 65 or 66 Geo.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

See Debtor and a-editor; Trust.

Use of Wife's Money to pay Debts-Equity of Wife against Creditors
-Set-off of Moneys paid for Support of Wife.-A husband cannot
use his wife's separate money to pay his own debts, and if his creditor
knowingly receives her separate finds for her husband's debt, she can
recover the amount so paid. If the fund has been invested in realty
by the husband's creditor, the husband being insolvent, the land is subject to her claim, and she may enforce a lien thereon in a court of
equity: Maddox v. Oxcford, 65 or 66 Geo.
Where it was sought by the wife to recover from a creditor of her
husband who had knowingly received her funds in payment of his debt,
the amount so received with interest thereon and to subject land in
which such funds had been invested by the creditor, it was a proper
subject of equitable set-off against her claim, that the husband held a
bond for titles from the creditor to the land in controversy, which was
worth much more than the amount of the wife's fund invested therein,
that the husband was insolvent and unable to support her and that she
actually subsisted on the rents, issues and profits of the land : Id.
INJUNOTION.

See ConstitutionalLaw; Nuisance.

INSURANCE.

See ConstitutionalLaw.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

See National Bank ; Usury.
INTEREST.
Agreement to compound-Consideration.-The maker of a note bearing simple interest being sued upon the note, agreed by a separate
instrument in writing, in consideration of the dismissal of the suit, that
interest thereafter to accrue upon the note if not paid when due, should
bear interest. Held, that this agreement was founded upon a sufficient
consideration and was valid. The fact that it was made after the note
was executed and by 'a separate instrument, was immaterial: Jasper
County v. Tavis, 76 Mo.
Open Account.-An open account does not begin to bear interest until
payment has been demanded: Richardson v. Laclede County, 76 Mo.
JURY.
Irregulaity in selecting a Grand Jury-Effect upon an Indictment
found by it.-In the selection of a grand and petit jury for Baltimore county, under the provisions of the Act of 1870, ch. 220, one
of the forty-eight names drawn for the general panel was'that of a nonresident of the county. This name was not, however, among those
which were drawn as grand jurors. Held, 1. That whatever weight the
non-residence of the party might have had in determining his own qualification as a petit juror, it had no substantial bearing upon the qualifications or fitness of those actually constituting the grand jury. 2. That
the statute was to be regarded mainly as directory in its multifarious
provisions; and unless any irregularities incident to carrying out its
directions in good faith, should be shown to materially violate it, or so
affect the juries as to prejudice the rights of the citizen, these irregularities should not be treated as fatal. 3. That the irregularity in this
instance was no ground for a plea in abatement to an indictment found
by said grand jury: State v. Glascow, 59 Md.
Exemption-Disability.-Thefact that one of the grand jury indicting a person, and one of the petit jury which tried and convicted him,
were over the age of seventy years, does not form proper ground for a
writ of error: Green v. The State, 59 Md.
A proper construction of the several provisions of our law on the subject of the qualifications of jurors, gives an exemption to persons over
seventy, and does not create a disability: Id.
If by mistake an exempted person is-drawn on the grand or petit
jury, and he choose to waive his privilege, and give no information of
his age or cause of excuse, and preferring to serve, does serve, this is
no reason for anybody's complaining, nor is there any sound reason for
disturbing the verdict, or arresting the judgment because of the presence
of such person on the jury: Id.
A law must be accorded such construction as will most reasonably
accomplish the legislative purpose: Id.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.

Adverse Possession.-Upona plea of the Statute of Limitations, the
only evidence given of possession during the first year of the statutory
period was that defendant's grantor went once upon the land, set up two
stakes at what he was told were corners, triad to ascertain the boundaries
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and afterward paid the taxes for the year: Hfeld. that this did not
amount to possession, and the plea was not sustained: Bradstreet v.
Kinsella, 76 Mo.
MECHANICS' LIEN.
Taking of Note for- Waiver.-Where a promissory note is given
and received in payment of a mechanic's claim for materials furnished
and work done in erecting a house under a contract with the owner, the
lien of the mechanic is waived: Orooks v. Door, Sash and Lumber Co.,
38 or 39 Ohio St.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
Power to Authorize the .D,'ectionof Railway Gates-juryto Private
Owner.-The city authorities have the power to establish such reasonable appliances in the public thoroughfares where railroads pass along,
as will, by a temporary arrest of travel, protect the public from the danger of meeting passing trains: Textor v. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., 59 Md.
Assuming that the device of a post and beam for a safety railway
gate at a street crossing a railroad is an approved one, the planting Of
the necessary post and the temporary interruption thereby of travel near
the crossing, during the period of danger, must be submitted to, notwithstanding, from the propinquity of a man's residence to the railroad
track, it may work more interruption to him than to others : Id.
Neglgence-Officers-Notice.--In an action against a municipal corporation for damages resulting from the breaking of a plank in a bridge
in one of its streets, the ground of the action is either positive misfeasance on the part of the corporation, its officers or servants, or of
others under its authority, in doing acts which caused the street to be
out of repair, or else neglect by the corporation to put the street in
repair, or remove obstructions therefrom, or remedy causes of danger
,occasioned by the wrongful acts of others. In the former case, no
farther notice to the corporation of the condition of the street is essential to its liability. In the latter case notice of the corndition of the
street, or what is equivalent to notice, is necessary: .Afayor, &e., of
Brunswick v. Braxton, 65 or 66 Ga.
NATIONAL BANK.
lVsury ,Setoff.-Interest received by a national bank upon a promissory note, greater than the rate allowed by the laws of the state
,Where the note was made, in violation of the U. S. Rev. Stats., sect.
5197, cannot be set off, in an action by the bank upon the note, against
the amount due thereon; but the bank is entitled to recover only the
face of the note, without interest: First National Bank of -Peterborough v. Childs, 133 Mass.
N:EGLIGENCE.

See .Municipal Corporation.
NUISANCE.

Ringing of Bell--Injuncti~n.-The ringing, at an early hour in the
ifibrning (for the purpose of arousing the keepers of boarding-houses
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where operatives in a mill live, or for the purpose of arousing the operatives themselves), of a bell weighing two thousand pounds and set in
an open tower forty feet from the ground, and so situated with respect
to the residences of persons, owned and occupied by them before the
erection of the bell, that they receive the full force of the sound, such
persons being thereby deprived of sleep during hours usually devoted
to repose, and personally annoyed and disturbed, and the quiet and comfort of their homes impaired, is a private nuisance to them ; the owner
of the mill may be restrained by injunction from ringing the bell for
such purposes, the ringing not being shown to be necessary or reasonable; and evidence of a custom to ring the bells in other places for
similar purposes is inadmissible: Davis v. Bawyer, 133 Mass.
PUBLIC POLICY.

See Corporation.

See ConstitutionalLaw.

RAILROALD.

RES JUDICATA.

Judgment of Court of Last Resort.-The doctrine of res jndicata
applies as well to judgments of courts 'of last resort as to those of nisi
rus courts. If the same subject-matter comes in question in a second
action before a court of last resort, it is bound by its own former
decision: Choteau v. Gibson, 76 Mo.
SALE.

See .Damages.

Warranty of Qualty-Fertilizers.-A merchant always warrants
that what he sells is reasonably suited to the use for which it is bought.
Therefore in a suit on a note given for chemi als to be used as a fertilizer,
the plea being failure of consideration, there was no error in charging
"that if the jury believed from the evidence that the fertilizer for
which the note was given was properly and skilfully applied by defendants, that the soil was suitable and the seasons favorable, and that the
fertilizer failed to produce any result as to an increase in the crops,
then the fertilizer was not reasonably suited to the purpose for which it
was sold, and you should find for the defendants," the converse of the
proposition being fully given : Barry v. lsry, 65 or 66 Ga.
STATUTE.

Repeal of Prewr Law.-When an affirmative statute contains no
expression of a purpose to repeal a prior law, it does not repeal it unless
the two acts are in irreconcilable conflict, or unless the later statute
covers the whole ground occupied by the earlier and is clearly intended
as a substitute for it, and the intention of the legislature to repeal must
be clear and manifest; The Town of Red Rock v. Hen-y, S. 0. U. S.,
Oct. Term 1882.
SURETIES.

General Bond of Executor-Subsequent Misappropriationof Hone)s
included in Special Bond.-The sureties on a general bond given by
an executor, who has also given a special bond with sureties to account
for, and dispose of according to law, the proceeds of a sale, under a
license of the probate court, of the real estate of his testator, remaining
after payment of debts, legacies and charges of administration, are not
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liable for the neglect of the executor to pay over to the residuary
legatees entitled thereto the balance of the proceeds of such sale,
although the executor charges himself in his general account with the
whole of such balance: Robinson v. iilland,133 Mass.
TAXATION.

See ConstitutionalLaw.
TRUST.

Validity.-A residuary clause in a will in these words: "At the
decease of my wife Esther I give and bequeath all my estate, real and
personal, for the preaching of the gospel of the blessed Son of God, as
taught by the people known now as Disciples of Christ. The preaching
to be well and faithfully done in Lorain county, in Birmingham, and at
Berlin, in Erie county, Ohio, and I nominate and appoint John Cyrenius,
Silas Wood and Samuel Steadman executors of this item of my last
will and testament, and I request them to do the business without
remuneration,"-creates a valid trust which will be enforced in a court
of equity: Sowers v. Cyrenius, 38 or 39 Ohio. St.
Settlement in Fraudof Creditors-MarriedWoman-A person cannot settle his property in trust to pay the income to himself for life,
with a provision that it shall not be alienated by anticipation, so as to
prevent his creditors from reaching the income by a bill in equity, and
this rule applies to a married woman settling her separate property after
marriage, where she has by law the right to make contracts as if she
were sole : Pacific Nat..Bank v. Windrar, 133 Mass.
Provision against Seizure by Creditors.-A person having the entire
sight to dispose of property may settle it in trust in favor of another,
with the provision that the income shall not be alienated by the beneficiary by anticipation, or be subject to be taken by his creditors in
advance of its payment to him, although there is no cesser or limitation
of the estate in such an event: Broadway Nat. Bank v. Adams, 133
Mass.
UNITED STATES COURTS.

See Corporation.

UsuRy. See .NationalBank.
Nature of- Wihen cannot be set u.-A
usury statute avoided the
interest only, and by a constitution subsequently adopted all usury laws
were abolished. -Held,that as to a contract made while the usury
statute was in force the right of the defendant to interpose its provisions as a defence was taken away by the subsequent constitution, it
being a privilege that belongs to the remedy, and forming no element
in the rights that inhere in the contract; Efwell v. Daggs, S. C. U. S.,
Oct. Term 1.882.
VENDOR AND YVENDEE.

See Damages.

Purchaser of Equitable Title-Equities between Vendor and Holder
of Legal Title.-The purchaser of an equitable title to land takes it
subject to all the equities between his vendor and the holder of the
legal title as they exist at the time of his purchase. Thus, where a
county sold swamp land on credit, and caused a certificate of purchase
to be delivered to the purchaser specifying the terms of the sale, and

